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ABSTRACT 
Article 267(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union obliges national courts 
adjudicating in the last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union for the correct interpretation and application of European Union 
law. Failure to do so may have consequences for the Member State under EU law as well as 
violate Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. When ruling on such matter 
the European Court of Human Rights must not overstep the dividing line between the 
jurisdictions of itself and the Court of Justice of the European Union while preferably 
maintaining consistency or at least compatibility with European Union law while not 
compromising the protection of the  protection of the right to a fair trial. The difficulty thereof 
is reflected in the case- law of the European Court of Human Rights, which may occasionally 
provide problematic solutions. However, examination in the context of the possible 
consequences in European Union in several aspects suggests a complementary relationship, 
which seems to be disrupted or at least diminished by the recent Commission v France 
judgement of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
 
Keywords: European Court of Human Rights, Court of Justice of European Union, reference 
for a preliminary ruling, right to a fair trial. 
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SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the situation when a national court adjudicating in last instance refuses to 
make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union from 
the perspectives of European Union law, the European Convention on Human Rights. This 
situation is analysed in the broader context of the relationship between the Court of Justice of 
the European Union and European Court of Human Rights.  
Firstly, the case- law of the European Court of Human Rights is examined, tracing the 
development of the assess the attitude of the ECtHR and its conditions and requirements for 
finding a violation of Article 6 of the Convention in this situation. The difficulty of the task of 
the European Court of Human Rights not to overstep the dividing line between the its 
jurisdiction and that of Court of Justice is demonstrated. Comments and analysis are provided 
for the most notable cases. A mutually benefiting and complementary relationship is found 
between the requirements set by the European Court of Human Rights and European Union 
law. 
Secondly, the situation is examined from the perspective of European Union law according to 
which, first, State liability and, second, direct action brought by the European Commission 
against the Member State are analyzed as the possible consequences. As for the first, Article 
267(3) of the Treaty of the Functioning of European Union alone in its current form is found to 
be unable to invoke State liability and the obligation to provide reparation to the party who had 
requested making a reference for a preliminary ruling. However, a mutually benefiting and 
complementary relationship is again found between the requirements set by the European Court 
of Human Rights and criteria for invoking State liability for breaches attributable to the judicial 
branch. As for the second, direct actions brought by the European Commission against the 
Member State are identified as a more effective measure, which has been made available after 
the Commission v France judgement for the first time found an infringement of Article 267(3) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.   
Thirdly, upon a closer analysis a critical view of the reasoning in the Commission v France 
judgement is provided. Apart from an effect purely in the European Union law field, the 
possible consequences of decreasing or entirely dismantling the margin of appreciation enjoyed 
by national courts adjudicating in last instance is identified. In the context of the case- law of 
the European Court of Human Rights it is found to diminish the mutually benefiting and 
complementary relationship identified in the interplay of both courts up to that judgement.  
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INTRODUCTION  
The importance of the preliminary ruling procedure cannot be overstated the not only for 
development of European Union (hereinafter EU) law but also the Union as a whole.1 Playing 
the central role in the judicial cooperation between the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(hereinafter CJEU) and national courts, it ensures that EU law is applied and interpreted 
consistently in all Member States with their diverse judicial systems and traditions2, thus 
making a uniform EU legal order a reality.  
As established in Article 267 TFEU national courts have the opportunity to refer questions for 
preliminary rulings to the CJEU regarding interpretation, application or validity of EU law or 
its acts is necessary to deliver a judgement.3 In particular the national courts adjudicating in last 
instance are obliged by Article 267(3) TFEU to make a reference if such question arises. The 
failure to do so is an infringement of the Treaty for which the Commission may bring an action 
against the Member State. The possibility that the Commission may start such an action was 
considered hypothetical and the Commission’s practice as reluctant. In the landmark case 
Commission v France4 of 8 October 2018, the CJEU found a failure of the French Conseil 
d’État (Council of State) to make a preliminary reference a breach of Article 267(3) TFEU. In 
the European legal regime this judgement interplays with the European Convention on Human 
Rights (hereinafter ECHR or Convention), particularly the right to fair trial established in 
Article 6.5 
A situation often arises where a party to a pending case before a national court adjudicating in 
last instance requests to refer a question to the CJEU but the national court under the obligation 
of Article 267(3) TFEU decides the case without making a reference for a preliminary ruling to 
the CJEU. The party that disagrees with the outcome, considering that EU law should have be 
applied or had been incorrectly interpreted, has the option to make an application to the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR) claiming a violation of the right to fair 
trial established in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR 
or Convention). 
Here lies the problematic of the situation. The ECtHR finds itself in the unenviable situation 
where it must to rule on an alleged violation of the ECHR which originates from an obligation 
of the Member State by EU law, which is beyond its jurisdiction to interpret. Although such 
situations demonstrate a fascinating clashpoint between the two international courts they have 
not received much attention in scholarship, which is mostly limited to the acknowledgement of 
the existing practice of the ECtHR without deeper analysis.6 This thesis will aim to contribute 
to the existing discussion both in a descriptive and analytical approach and answer the following 
two research questions. First, what has been the interplay between the CJEU and the ECtHR in 
finding the failure of national courts to make a preliminary reference to the CJEU a violation 
                                               
1 Morten Bromberg and Niels Fenger, “Preliminary references as a right- but for whom? The extent to which 
preliminary reference decisions can be subject to appeal,” European Law Review  36(2) (2011): p.267. 
2 Anthony Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 95. 
3 Judgement of 16 January 1974, Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel, C-166/73, ECR 1974 -00033, para.2. 
4 Judgement of  4 October 2018, Commission v France, C-416/17, EU:C:2018:811. 
5 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as 
amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, Rome, 4 November 1950. Available at: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf Accessed May 9, 2019. 
6 Regina Valutytè, “State Liability for the Infringement of the Obligation to Refer for a Preliminary Ruling under 
the European Convention on Human Rights,” Jurisprudencija 19(1) (2012): p.9. 
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of Article 6 ECHR? Second, how will the Commission v France judgement of 8 October 2018 
affect this established interplay between the two Courts? 
In order to do so, firstly, the case- law of the ECtHR will be analyzed to assess the attitude of 
the ECtHR and its conditions and requirements for finding a violation of Article 6 of the 
Convention. Then the legal consequences for a breach of Article 267(3) TFEU will be analyzed 
from two perspectives in EU law, State liability and an infringement action brought by the 
Commission. Lastly, the Commission v France judgement will be examined in detail and put 
in the context of the previous interplay between the two courts and conclusions will be made 
therefrom. 
1. THE PRELIMINARY RULING PROCEDURE AND ARTICLE 267 
TFEU 
In the EU judicial system much of the responsibility for applying EU law belongs to the national 
courts of the Member States.7  Such a situation is problematic as  the same rules need to be 
applied in a number of independent judicial systems with varying national traditions and this is 
very likely to produce inconsistent results.8 Therefore the preliminary ruling procedure is 
established to guarantee that “the [EU] law has the same effect in all circumstances in all 
Member States”9. The CJEU has defined that the aim of the preliminary ruling is to ensure 
“proper application and uniform interpretation of Community law” and in particular to “prevent 
a body of national case-law that is not in accordance with the rules of Community law”.10 The 
preliminary ruling procedure creates “a form of judicial conversation or dialogue”11 between 
the national courts and the CJEU to jointly find a solution to a case that is in line with the 
applicable EU law.12  In the EU judicial system,  national courts function as “delegates” of the 
CJEU13 who stand at the frontline of EU law enforcement, while the CJEU is left with resolving 
the problematic questions14  often of fundamental importance where differences in 
interpretation might arise.  
 The preliminary ruling procedure enables a national court ruling of any instance to refer to the 
CJEU a question on EU law that is “necessary to enable it to give judgement”15. According to 
Article 267(1) TFEU16 the CJEU has jurisdiction to rule on particularly the interpretation of the 
Treaties and the interpretation, application of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies 
of the Union. It is not in its jurisdiction to decide on matters in national law and other 
international obligations.17 The preliminary ruling procedure on questions on this matter takes 
                                               
7 Arnull, supra note 2, p. 95. 
8 Arnull, supra note 2, p. 95. 
9 Court of Justice of the European Union. “The Proceedings of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance of 
the European Communities” a report of 22 to 26 May 1995 No. 15/95, para. 11. Available on: 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/cf9e5ef4-c498-4699-aaa7-449c04dce3e3 
Accessed April 24, 2019. 
10 Judgement of 22 February 2001, Ministério Público and António Gomes Valente v Fazenda Pública, C-393/98, 
ECR I-1327, para. 17. 
11 Arnull, supra note 2, p. 95. 
12 Arnull, supra note 2, p. 96. 
13 Paul Craig “Community Court Jurisdiction Revisited” in The European Court of Justice ed. Grainne de Burca 
and J.H.H. Weiler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): p. 179. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Judgement of Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, supra note 3.  
16 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated version 2012), OJ C 326, 26.10.2012. Available 
on: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT. Accessed April 30, 2019. 
17 Morten Broberg and Niels Fenger, Preliminary references to the European Court of 
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place as a separate step in the pending proceedings before a national court. The decision to 
make a reference for a preliminary ruling must be made entirely by the national court which 
should distance itself from any initiative from the parties.18 After receiving an answer from the 
CJEU in the form of a preliminary ruling, a national court proceeds by applying it to the facts 
of the case.19 The preliminary ruling is not addressed and cannot be enforced against the parties. 
It is strictly addressed only to the referring national court.20 It would also be unsuitable for such 
purpose as the question referred and answer provided by the CJEU is formulated in an abstract 
manner. 
Article 267 TFEU21 has a direct effect on national legal systems. According to Article 267(2) 
TFEU22 the national courts of Member States are allowed to decide whether to make a 
preliminary reference to the CJEU regarding interpretation of EU law.23 That is not so for courts 
adjudicating in the last instance for which making a reference for a preliminary ruling is not an 
option but rather an obligation. This is established by Article 267(3) TFEU which provides that, 
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a 
Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, 
that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court.24 
Notably, Article 267(3) TFEU encompasses not only the courts who stand at the top of the 
hierarchy of a national judicial system or whose judgements are final. The main criterion for 
being under the obligation of Article 267(3) TFEU is that no judicial remedy is available to the 
judgement of that court under national law.25 
2. EXCEPTIONS TO THE OBLIGATION OF ARTICLE 267(3) TFEU 
The obligation for national courts adjudicating in last instance is however not absolute.  In the 
landmark CILFIT case26 the Court established three situations when a national court 
adjudicating in last instance may dismiss its obligation under 267(3) TFEU to refer a question 
to the CJEU, also famously called the CILFIT criteria. First, if the question is irrelevant, that 
is, whatever may be the answer it would not affect the outcome of the case.27 Second, if a 
materially identical question has been previously answered by the Court and thus the correct 
interpretation of EU law has already been provided also known as the acte éclairé doctrine. 
Thirdly, if no scope for reasonable doubt exists about the correct interpretation of EU law and 
thus any risk that a national court would apply EU law inconsistently is supposedly ruled out 28 
known as the acte clair doctrine. Moreover, the CJEU has clarified that in order to rely on the 
                                               
Justice. Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 107. 
18 Judgement of 9 November 2010, VB Penzügyi Lízing Zrt. v. Ference Schneider, C-137/08, EU:C:2010:659, 
para. 28. 
19 Arnull, supra note 2, p. 98. 
20 Broberg and Fenger, supra note 17, p. 1. 
21 The cases and materials used in this thesis often refer to the Article 234 EC or Article 177 EEC, corresponding 
to equivalent provisions in the previous treaties. The provisions on the preliminary ruling procedure and the 
obligation of national courts adjudicating in last instance will be referred to as Article 267 TFEU and Article 
267(3) TFEU regardless of the numbering used in the original source. 
22 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 16. 
23 Arnull, supra note 2, p. 114. 
24 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, supra note 16. 
25 Arnull, supra note 2, pp. 119-120. 
26 Judgement of 6 October 1982, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health, C-283/81, ECR 
1982-03415. 
27 Julia Laffranque, “(Just) Give Me a Reason,” Juridica International Law review, 27 (2018): p. 15. 
28 Broberg and Fenger, supra note 17, p. 235. 
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acte clair doctrine the national court of last instance must be “(..) convinced that the matter is 
equally obvious to the courts of other Member States and to the CJEU.”29 Two steps are 
required for this to be satisfied. First, the national court of last instance must be certain that no 
ambiguity exists about the interpretation of EU law from its own perspective. Second, it must 
find that it is beyond reasonable doubt that courts of other Member States and the CJEU would 
come to the same conclusion. In these situations, the court of last instance is no longer required 
but still has the opportunity to make a preliminary reference30 however the it is highly unlikely 
that in such situation the CJEU will address such question. 
Article 267 TFEU leaves a margin of appreciation to national courts.31 The national courts are 
not required to be convinced beyond any doubt that a reference for a preliminary ruling need 
not be made. The margin of appreciation decreases for the courts higher in the hierarchy of the 
judicial system and is the smallest for courts adjudicating in last instance, 32 for which it is 
expressed only as exceptions to an obligation, deriving from Article 267(3) TFEU. 
3. CASE- LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
Although no formal relationship exists between the CJEU and ECtHR, in practice both 
have been willing to take into consideration each other’s legal systems and avoid consistent 
case- law and imposing conflicting obligations to the states.33 Moreover, the courts in 
Strasbourg and Luxembourg have strived to maintain mutual neutrality and respect for limits 
of their jurisdictions. The approach of the ECtHR to the procedural aspects before the CJEU in 
the in context of Article 6 of the Convention has been mentioned as a demonstration of 
particular deference towards EU law.34 To that end in the Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie 
van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij U.A. v the Netherlands35 judgement the ECtHR found the 
EU legal system considerably different from that of Member States and fund that therefore 
different procedural rules can reasonably be applied and different standards are permitted by 
the ECtHR.36 This has also been demonstrated in situations where a national court has failed to 
fulfil its obligation under Article 267(3) TFEU. 
 The CJEU considers itself the only authority to provide interpretation of EU law. 37 
Even more, the CJEU has even avoided to address the failure to fulfil the obligation of Article 
267(3) TFEU in the context of Article 6 of the Convention even when given an opportunity to 
                                               
29Judgement of CILFIT, supra note 26, para 16. 
30 Broberg and Fenger, supra note 17, pp. 233-235. 
31 Vincent Delhomme and Lucie Larripa “C-416/17 Commission v France : Failure of a Member State to fulfil its 
obligations under Article 267(3) TFEU,” European Law Blog, November 22, 2018. Available on: 
http://europeanlawblog.eu/2018/11/22/c-416-17-commission-v-france-failure-of-a-member-state-to-fulfil-its-
obligations-under-article-2673-tfeu/ Accessed March 18, 2018. 
32 Carri Ginter, “Legal implications of not asking a for preliminary rulings by the highest courts”, presentation in 
the Erasmus+ Jean Monet Conference Constitutional Law and Fundamental Rights, Riga Graduate School of Law, 
April 26, 2019.  
33 Peter Van Dijk, Fried Van Hoof, Arjen Van Rijn and Leo Zwaak, Theory and Practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Fifth Edition (Mortsel: Intersentia, 2018), p. 340. 
34 Ibid, p. 343. 
35 Decision on admissibility delivered by a Chamber Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse 
Kokkelvisserij U.A. v the Netherlands no. 13645/05, ECHR 2009. 
36 Van Dijk, Van Hoof, Van Rijn and Zwaak, supra note 33, p. 343. 
37 Zane Sedlova, Tiesību aizsardzības mehānismi, ja tiesa neuzdod prejudiciālo jautājumu (a dissertation) (Riga: 
Publication of Zane Sedlova with the support of sworn advocates’ office of Romualds Vosnovičš, 2017), p. 171.  
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do so. The matter was raised by Advocate General Léger in his opinion38 for the landmark 
Köbler case. Advocate General Léger pointed out that a breach of Article 267 TFEU may result 
in an infringement of the Convention mentioning a few examples.39 The CJEU however did not 
pick up the issues raised by Advocate General Léger and dismissed this matter entirely.40 
Whereas, the ECtHR for a long time refused to decide on any matter concerning the relationship 
of the CJEU and national courts. Applications regarding a refusal to make a reference for a 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU  have been submitted to the ECtHR dating back as early as 
1993.41 The ECtHR constantly declared such applications inadmissible42 despite their 
considerable number, while still analyzing the applicant’s request and the national courts’ 
refusal and its motivation.43 These decisions allow to identify the factors considered by the 
ECtHR when deciding a possible violation of the right to fair trial44 Only recently in 2011 in 
the Ullens de Schooten45 judgement  the ECtHR first decided on merits a case of a refusal to 
make a reference for a preliminary ruling. Several other judgements have followed including 
Dhahbi v Italy46 which for the first time found a refusal to make a reference for a preliminary 
ruling to violate the right to fair trial. Nonetheless a decision finding the application 
inadmissible still remains the most likely outcome for a complaint of a violation of the right to 
a fair trial due to a breach of Article 267(3) TFEU by a national court.47  
3.1. Prohibition of arbitrary non- referral- cases arising from Belgium 
Before delving into the judgements and decisions of the ECtHR regarding the refusal to make 
preliminary reference to the CJEU, three judgements that arise from the unique domestic 
preliminary question procedure in the court system of Belgium will be looked upon. Chapter II 
Article 26-30 of the Special Act of 6 January 1989 on the Constitutional Court of Belgium48  
(hereinafter the Special Act) obliges the lower instance courts of Belgium to ask a preliminary 
question to the Constitutional Court (at the time of the judgements named the Administrative 
Jurisdiction and Procedure Court) when ruling on a number of matters connected to the 
repartition of competences between the Federal State, the Monarch and the Regions as well as 
provides occasions where the courts are exempt from this obligation. This system provides a 
fertile ground for disputes on compatibility of a refusal to ask a preliminary question with 
Article 6 of the Convention and illustrates the attitude of the ECtHR to preliminary questions 
and the right to a fair trial generally. Delivered before the judgements and decisions specifically 
on the references for preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice according to Article 267(3) 
                                               
38 Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Léger delivered on 8 April 2003 for Judgement of 30 September 2003, 
Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich, C-224/01, ECR 2003 I-10239. 
39 Valutytè, supra note 6. 
40 Sedlova, supra note 37, p. 171, footnote 473. 
41 The earliest example found by the author is the Admissibility decision Divagsa Company v Spain, no. 20631/92, 
12 May 1993. 
42 Sedlova, supra note 37, p. 173.  
43 Sedlova, supra note 37, p. 173. 
44 Sedlova, supra note 37, p. 176. 
45 Judgment on merits and just satisfaction delivered by a Chamber Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v. Belgium, 
nos. 3989/07 and 38353/07, ECHR 2011. 
46 Judgment on merits and just satisfaction delivered by a Chamber Dhahbi v. Italy, no. 17120/09, ECHR 2014. 
47 Carrri Ginter, “Legal implications of not asking a for preliminary rulings by the highest courts”, presentation in 
the Erasmus+ Jean Monet Conference Constitutional Law and Fundamental Rights, Riga Graduate School of Law, 
April 26, 2019. 
48 Belgium. Special Act of 6 January 1989 on the Constitutional Court (January 6, 1989, last amended January 15, 
2017). Available on: http://www.const-court.be/en/common/home.html Accessed March 25, 2019. 
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TFEU these judgements established universal argumentation which applies to the failure to 
make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU as well.49 
3.1.1. The standard of non- arbitrariness and requirement to provide reasoning 
In the Coëme50 judgement the defendants disputed the jurisdiction of the Court of Cassation to 
hear the case of the defendants and compatibility of application of Code of Criminal 
Investigation with the Judicial Code and the Constitution of Belgium51 and requested the Court 
of Cassation to as a preliminary question to the Administrative Jurisdiction and Procedural 
Court on these issues.52 The Court of Cassation motivated the refusal to do so by stating that 
the subject of these questions did not concern a matter that requires asking a preliminary 
question according to Article 26 of the Special Law.53 In their complaint to the ECtHR the 
applicants submitted inter alia that such a refusal was arbitrary and in breach of Articles 6 of 
the Convention. 
The judgement established argumentation54  that the ECtHR reiterates almost verbatim in all 
the cases concerning preliminary questions and which serves as a basis for elaboration on 
references for preliminary rulings to the CJEU. The ECtHR observed in the judgement that: 
the Convention does not guarantee, as such, any right to have a case referred by a 
domestic court to another national or international authority for a preliminary ruling.55 
The formulation that the Convention “does not guarantee” such right has been interpreted by 
scholars in a twofold manner.56 It can be seen as an acknowledgement that a decision to ask a 
preliminary question is a matter regulated by national and EU law which is outside the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR to interpret. A more likely interpretation, although the right to a 
reference is not an “absolute right”, it is protected indirectly by securing the right to fair trial 
generally.57  
Further the ECtHR recalled that “right to court” guaranteed by the Convention is not absolute 
and subject to limitations, regarding which the State enjoys a “certain margin of appreciation” 
and ruled that  
the right to have a preliminary question referred to a court cannot be absolute either, 
even where a particular field of law may be interpreted only by a court designated by 
                                               
49 Morten Bromberg, “National Courts of Last Instance Failing to Make a Preliminary Reference: The (Possible) 
Consequences Flowing Therefrom,” European Public Law, 22(2) (2016): p. 245.  
50 Judgment on the merits and just satisfaction delivered by a Chamber Coëme and others v. Belgium, nos. 
32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 33210/96, ECHR 2000-VII 
51 Ibid, § 47. 
52 Ibid, § 111. 
53 Ibid, § 47. 
54 The standard of non-arbitrariness was employed in a number of decisions before Coëme concerning references 
for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU, for instance the early examples Admissibility decision Divagsa Company v 
Spain, no. 20631/92, 12 May 1993; and Admissibility decision N.S. v France, no, 15669/89, 28 June 1993; 
Admissibility decision Spiele v the Netherlands, no. 31467/96, 22 October 1997; Partial admissibility decision 
Schweigenhofer, Rauch, Heinemann and Mach v Austria, nos. 35673/97, 35674/97, 36082/97 and 37579/97, 24 
August 1999. See also Admissibility decision Dotta v Italy, no. 38399/97, 7 September 1999 and Admissibility 
decision Preidl Anstalt S.A. v. Italy, no. 31993/96, 8 June 1999, to which the ECtHR directly refers to in §114 in 
Coëme. It has however occurred that the first judgement of the ECtHR where this approach and the non-
arbitrariness standard is used concerns the preliminary questions to the Belgian Administrative Jurisdiction and 
Procedure Court, which is also the first judgement where preliminary questions to that court have been subject to 
examination of the ECtHR.  
55 Judgment of Coëme and others v. Belgium, supra note 50, §114. 
56 Valutytè, supra note 6, p. 10. 
57 Valutytè, supra note 6, p. 10. 
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statute and where the legislation concerned requires other courts to refer to that court, 
without reservation, all questions relating to that field.58 
However, the Court did not rule out such option entirely by stating that 
(..) it is not completely impossible that, in certain circumstances, refusal by a domestic 
court trying a case at final instance might infringe the principle of fair trial, as set forth 
in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, in particular where such refusal appears arbitrary.59 
Thus, most importantly, the ECtHR established the standard that for a refusal to ask a 
preliminary question to be compatible with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is must not appear 
arbitrary (hereinafter the standard of non- arbitrariness).60 This became a universal standard in 
the future cases concerning refusals to ask preliminary questions to both national and 
international courts and tribunals and the right to a fair trial. 
The ECtHR further provided the method to assess the arbitrariness of a refusal.  The fact that 
the Court of Cassation considered the applicants claims and stated “sufficient reasons which do 
not appear arbitrary” for the refusal was sufficient for the Court to find no breach of Article 6 
§ 1 of the Convention. The Court did not analyze the decision any further in this respect. The 
presence of reasoning or providing reasons became the main instrument to assess the 
arbitrariness of a refusal in the subsequent cases61 both concerning preliminary questions to the 
Administrative Jurisdiction and Procedure Court of Belgium in cases Ernst and Others v 
Belgium62 and Wynen and Centre Hospitalier Interregional Edith- Cavell v Belgium63 and 
references for preliminary rulings to the CJEU, as demonstrated in later chapters of this thesis.  
The second subsequent case arising from Belgium Wynen and Centre Hospitalier Interregional 
Edith- Cavell v Belgium64 decided on 5 February 2003 will be further analyzed to demonstrate 
the mutually beneficial effect of the standard of non- arbitrariness which is particularly 
highlighted by the separate of Judge Lemmens65. 
 In Wynen the applicants had requested the Court of Cassation to ask a preliminary question to 
the Administrative Jurisdiction and Procedure Court on the compatibility of a national act, first, 
with the rules on distribution of power between the Belgian state and the regions and, second, 
the Constitution. The Court of Cassation dismissed these requests. For the first, the Court of 
Cassation held that the applicants had failed to sufficiently specify the alleged contraventions 
between the act and rules on distribution of powers. The second question was declared 
inadmissible. In their complaint to the ECtHR the applicants submitted that by dismissing the 
requests the Court of Cassation had violated their right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the 
Convention. The ECtHR reiterated the argumentation established in Coëme in the same 
wording as cited above, deciding on the violation of the right to fair trial by assessing the 
arbitrariness of the refusal. The ECtHR observed that the Court of Cassation “took account of 
the applicants’ complaints” and “ruled on the matter in decisions grounded on sufficient reasons 
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which do not appear to be tainted by any arbitrariness.”66 Just like in Coëme the ECtHR did not 
give an elaborate explanation on the decision in the specific situation, limited by its jurisdiction 
and leaving interpretation of domestic legislation to national courts.67 
Judge Lemmens in his separate opinion picked up where the judgement had left and provided 
an insight into the argumentation.  Although in agreement with the conclusion of the Court, he 
wrote that “it would be helpful to qualify somewhat the reasons that led to that conclusion”68 
and further undertook this task. Judge Lemmens identified that the Court of Cassation had in 
fact itself answered the second question on constitutionality that the applicants had wished to 
refer to the Administrative Jurisdiction and Procedure Court. However, it was not found to be 
a sufficient ground for a violation of Article 6 of the Convention for two reasons. First, assessing 
such conduct of the Court of Cassation is a matter of domestic law which is not for the ECtHR 
to resolve. Second, as the Court of Cassation resolved the matter in question and provided 
reasons for its decision, the refusal could not be considered arbitrary within the meaning of 
Article 6 of the Convention: “[e]ven supposing that that decision was questionable from the 
point of view of domestic law, I fail to see how that could be sufficient to make it arbitrary.”69 
The standard of non- arbitrariness and the requirement to provide reasoning complemented by 
the insight of Judge Lemmens should be further examined in the context of the obligation under 
Article 267(3) TFEU a and its exceptions.  
3.1.2. The complementary relationship between the obligation under Article 267(3) 
TFEU and standard of non- arbitrariness 
In context of the CILFIT criteria, it does not appear problematic that even questionability under 
domestic law would not make a refusal arbitrary. The requirement of non-arbitrariness does not 
contradict the application of CILFIT criteria but rather complements the latter. As required by 
EU law, the national court adjudicating in last instance must ground its refusal on one of the 
CILFIT criteria and moreover must be certain that, first, no ambiguity exists about the 
interpretation of EU law from its own perspective, second, it must find that it is beyond 
reasonable doubt that courts of other Member States and the CJEU would come to the same 
conclusion.  
The standard of non- arbitrariness added by the ECtHR rather strengthens the application of the 
CILFIT criteria. A decision that is required not to be arbitrary by the ECtHR is also more likely 
to be sufficiently weighed out according to the CILFIT criteria and to leave out any ambiguity 
and contemplated to be in line with the hypothetic opinion of courts of other Member States 
and the Court of Justice. Also vice versa, contemplation of the CILFIT criteria a priori means 
that the decision is most likely not arbitrary. Thus, the CILFIT criteria and requirement for the 
decision not to be arbitrary supplement and endorse each other, promoting compliance both 
with EU law and Article 6 of the Convention.  
Moreover, this “symbiosis” is also not disrupted by the approach that a decision may also not 
be found arbitrary even if questionable under domestic law, as pointed out by Judge Lemmens. 
As mentioned, the courts have a margin of discretion, although limited, when deciding whether 
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CILFIT criteria are met.70 In other words, the CILFIT allow national courts to assume, without 
being sure beyond any doubt, that a solution of courts of other Member States and the Court of 
Justice would be the same. Allowing questionability under domestic law corresponds to the 
questionability of the assumed opinion of courts of other Member States and the Court of 
Justice.  
3.2. Refusals under Article 267(3) TFEU in admissibility decisions  
Having examined the general argumentation of the ECtHR in the cases about the Belgian 
domestic preliminary question procedure, the most important decisions on admissibility will be 
analyzed, which highlight the conditions and requirements considered by the ECtHR to 
references for preliminary rulings to the CJEU. The general argumentation is also applied in 
decisions on admissibility on references for preliminary rulings to the CJEU. The Convention 
does not guarantee the right to have a case referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling just as 
it does not in case of other national or international tribunals. The standard of non- arbitrariness 
is applied as well. The ECtHR expressly states that it does not exclude that a “refusal of a 
national court to decide in the final instance to refer the question for a preliminary ruling may, 
in certain circumstances, violate the principle the fairness of the procedure, in particular where 
such refusal appears to be arbitrary”71 thus not entirely ruling out an option that Article 6 of the 
Convention may be breached. For a long time in the early decisions on admissibility the 
examination was limited to reiteration of this argumentation72 and implicit signals that the 
arbitrariness was related to lack of motivation for the refusal.73 The ECtHR consistently refused 
to examine the case on the merits refusing jurisdiction by stating that “it is not competent to 
examine alleged errors of fact or law committed by national courts.”74 In later decisions the 
ECtHR adjusted its reasoning specifically to the obligation under Article 267(3) TFEU by 
setting two additional criteria to assess the standard of non- arbitrariness and specifying the 
requirement to provide reasoning thereby. These additional criteria, two that need to be met by 
the applicant and one that concerns the overall nature of the case, will be analyzed below.  
3.2.1 An express request made by the applicant 
The first criterion that the ECtHR uses to assess the standard of non- arbitrariness specifically 
for refusals to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU is whether the applicant 
made an express request for the national court to do so. An analysis of the decisions of the 
ECtHR allow to conclude that Article 6 of the Convention will not be violated by not providing 
reasoning for a refusal where the applicant has simply referred to the possibility to make a 
reference without formally requesting it or where the national court has simply considered such 
a possibility at its own motion.75 
The ECtHR has demonstrated that it will not consider that there has been a violation of the right 
to a fair trial when a request to make a preliminary reference was not expressed at all. As in the 
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decision Mens, Mens Hoek v the Netherlands76, the applicants had based their argumentation 
on the relevant EU legislation but never made an express request to make a reference. The 
ECtHR observed that “it does not appear that the applicants ever requested the Administrative 
Law Division to seek a preliminary ruling (..) or that they have argued before the Administrative 
Law Division that the procedure fell short of requirements under European Union rules.”77 In 
the decision Ryon v France78 the ECtHR approved this approach.79 While in the two above- 
menationed cases  there was no express request, controversial situations arise when the request 
was expressed but it is questionable  from a procedural point of view. 
Prospects are not clear in the situation if the applicant has made the request as a conditional 
and/or alternative motion rather than a self-standing request. For instance, in Krikorian v 
France80 the applicant sought annulment of domestic legislation and based his claims on a 
number of norms and general principles of Community law as well as several articles of the 
Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In addition, he alleged 
the legislation’s incompatibility with the Constitution. On top of that, the applicant submitted 
that  
in the alternative, if it considered it necessary to obtain an interpretation of Community 
law in order to decide the present dispute, the Counseil d’Etat would be led to put to the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities (...) the following question for a 
preliminary ruling (..)81 
The ECtHR found the reasoning provided by the Counseil d’État was sufficient not to be 
arbitrary because inter alia the request was made only in the alternative.82 However, the case-
law on the requirement for the request to be self- standing has not been consistent.83 For instance 
in the admissibility decision John v Germany84 the applicant, Mr. John asked the court “to 
dismiss an appeal alternatively, to make a referral to the European Court of Justice under Article 
234 EC”.85 The alternative nature of the request was not considered by the ECtHR. The decision 
however provides rich material for analysis on the other two criteria. 
In John v Germany the ECtHR was presented with two refusals to make a reference for a 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU, the first by the Hanseatic Court of Appeal and the second by 
the Federal Court of Justice (adjudicating in last instance) and the Federal Constitutional Court. 
The applicant had made an express request to the Hanseatic Court of Appeal which refused to 
make a reference by stating that it was not under the obligation of Article 267 TFEU. In his 
application to the Federal Court of Justice Mr. John’s requested to overrule the judgement of 
the Hanseatic Court of Appeal and to “decide in accordance with his motions lodged in the 
appeal proceedings.”86 The application did not contain a new express request to make a 
reference for a preliminary ruling. Lastly, the Federal Constitutional Court dismissed the 
constitutional complaint of Mr. John without giving any reasons.  
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The ECtHR declared the application inadmissible inter alia for the reason that the Mr.John’s 
submissions to the Federal Court of Justice did not contain an “express request for a reference 
under Article [267(3) TFEU].”87 In these circumstances the ECtHR found that the national 
courts’ decision could not be seen as arbitrary. It can be concluded that the ECtHR requires to 
make an express request at each instance where the matter is brought. This approach was subject 
to criticism both generally and specifically from the perspective of German procedural law.88 
Rosalind English has argued that the submission to “decide in accordance with the motions 
lodged in appeal proceedings” was sufficient because the request to make a preliminary 
reference was one of the mentioned motions; other motions referred to in that formulation were 
acknowledged by the Federal Court of Justice. Even more, formulating the submission in such 
way is common for appeals to the Federal Court of Justice of Germany, in order to avoid an 
unnecessary repetition of the motions made to the lower court.89   
Similarly, in admissibility decision Herma v Germany90 the applicants had raised an alleged 
obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling in an application to the Frankfurt/ Main 
Court of Appeal. The court rejected the appeal and the applicants made a constitutional 
complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court. The applicants claimed that by the rejection they 
were not given a proper hearing. The Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the 
complaint. Subsequently the applicants claimed a violation of right to fair trial inter alia by the 
national court’s refusal to make a reference for a preliminary ruling. The ECtHR declared the 
claim inadmissible as domestic remedies were not exhausted. 91 So, the ECtHR implied that the 
fact that the decision which contained a request and was the subject matter in the constitutional 
complaint did not constitute a request also made to the Federal Constitutional Court. 
3.2.2 Sufficient substantiation of the request by the applicant 
The examination of John v Germany leads to the second criterion, that is, the obligation for the 
applicant to sufficiently substantiate the request. The ECtHR found no arbitrariness in the 
refusal of the Federal Court of Justice also because the submission of Mr. John did not contain 
“express and precise reasons for the alleged necessity of a preliminary ruling.”92 While in John 
v Germany the ECtHR expressly referred to lack of reasoning, in many decisions it sided with 
the national court, which had rejected a request for that reason, thus implicitly approving this 
reasoning.  
In Matheis v Germany93 the ECtHR sided with the Federal Constitutional Court which did not 
“explicitly deal with the applicant’s request for a preliminary ruling”94 but found no 
arbitrariness in the refusal to do so  as the applicant “did not establish that her constitutional 
complaint related to any relevant question of Community law.”95 Similarly, in Moosbruger v 
Austria96 the ECtHR found no arbitrariness in the refusal of the Supreme Court of Austria which 
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had not made a reference for a preliminary ruling because “no relevant question of EU law had 
been raised by the applicant.”97 In the admissibility decision Spiele v the Netherlands98 the 
applicant claimed a national rule to be incompatible with three EC directives and a judgement 
of the CJEU and requested the Court of Appeal of Arnhem made a reference for a preliminary 
ruling. The Court of Appeal of Arnhem did not find any incompatibility and found a reference 
for a preliminary ruling unnecessary. Notably, the court stated that the applicant had failed to 
indicate with which provision of this third Directive [the national rule] was incompatible.”99 
The Supreme Court rejected the appeal in this matter, stating that the applicant had wrongly 
relied on the directive.100 The ECtHR found that the national courts had sufficiently considered 
the applicants arguments and the refusal was thus not arbitrary 101  The argumentation of the 
ECtHR leaves it  uncertain what substantiation needs to be provided by an applicant for it to be 
considered sufficient.  
Some authors have identified the obligation for the applicant to sufficiently substantiate the 
request as an obligation for the applicant to demonstrate sufficient relevance specifically for 
EU law.102 Indeed in most of the respective decision the ECtHR refers to insufficient 
argumentation related to the EU law applicable to the case. However, the author finds 
identifying the criteria to be a demonstration of relevance for EU law flawed for two reasons. 
First, it implies that in fact the ECtHR would be itself examining whether the interpretation of 
EU law is relevant for resolving the case, the first CILFIT exception. As already noted, the 
ECtHR in has no jurisdiction nor has it demonstrated willingness to interpret EU law in this 
matter. Secondly, such examination is by its nature examination of the merits of the case, which 
the ECtHR does not intend to do in the form of a decision. For these reasons, the author holds 
that the reference to EU law which the ECtHR makes when finding insufficient substantiation 
by the applicant is made merely due to the fact that the dispute concerns EU law. Logically in 
that situation a sufficient substantiation would need to be made employing EU law. The 
requirement to sufficiently substantiate a refusal is a procedural not material one as examined 
by the ECtHR; it does not require specifically the demonstration of relevance to EU law. 
In the context of John v Germany, the requirement to sufficiently substantiate the request has 
caused two points of criticism in the debate on the case- law of the Strasbourg court.103 Firstly, 
the obligation of a court adjudicating in last instance to make a reference for a preliminary 
ruling is in no way conditional on whether a party makes such a request and gives sufficient 
reasons for the request. Although parties may do so, under Article 267 (3) TFEU the court 
should make a reference for a preliminary ruling ex officio. Even more the CJEU has 
emphasized that the national courts should avoid any influence from the parties before it.104 
The author sides with the critics who have called the criterion questionable105 and argued that 
binding the referral to a sufficient request from the parties goes against the spirit of the 
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preliminary ruling procedure.106 Secondly, some critics argue that by this approach the ECtHR 
has in fact introduced an additional condition to the Kōbler case- law.107 On the one hand, this 
criticism is plausible. When a national court contemplates making a reference for a preliminary 
ruling, it should consider all external obligations, regardless whether they originate from the 
case-law of the Strasbourg or Luxembourg court. Nonetheless, the criticism ignores that this 
approach does not contradict the applicable EU law or step over the dividing lines of jurisdiction 
of both courts. The requirement to express a request and to sufficiently substantiate it concerns 
solely the interaction between the parties and the national court. EU law rules on the preliminary 
ruling procedure are completely detached from this matter and concern the interaction between 
different actors, the national court and the CJEU and specifically exclude the individual from 
the equation. A condition cannot be viewed as additional to those in EU law if it concerns an 
interaction between actors from which EU law deliberately disassociates itself. 
3.2.3 A fundamental legal issue 
John v Germany will be also used to demonstrate the third criterion, that is, whether the matter 
on which the reference for a preliminary ruling is requested raises a fundamentally important 
legal issue. It must be noted here that this criterion specifies the requirement to provide 
reasoning in the context of the obligation under Article 267(3) TFEU unlike the previous two, 
which were independent and additional. The ECtHR in John v Germany permitted that the 
superior national courts be exempted from the requirement to provide reasoning and dismiss 
the request by “mere reference to the relevant legal provisions (..) if the matter raises no 
fundamentally important legal issue.”108 The ECtHR found that the situation at hand did not 
concern such a matter and concluded that the Federal Court of Justice and Federal 
Constitutional Court were not obliged to provide reasoning for the refusal. 
Unlike the requirement to express request and to sufficiently substantiate it, the possibility not 
to provide reasoning if no fundamentally important legal issue has been raised risks stepping 
over the dividing lines of jurisdiction of both courts. The aim of the preliminary ruling of the 
CJEU is to clarify the correct interpretation and application of EU law. Whether a fundamental 
legal issue exists may be partially or even entirely a question of interpretation of EU law. A 
requirement to evaluate whether the matter concerns a fundamental legal question is futile. The 
national court in this situation is in fact would be asked to answer the question if the exceptions 
of Article 267(3) TFEU apply. Whereas the ECtHR in this situation would be required to do 
the same for the purpose of determining whether the national court was allowed to dismiss the 
obligation to give reasons. In other words, evaluating the fundamentality of the question poses 
a great risk for the ECtHR to apply EU law, about which the party and the national court 
disagree and which the ECtHR has no jurisdiction or willingness to interpret. It must be noted 
here that the ECtHR approved this condition again in the Case of Baydar v the Netherlands109 
analyzed below.  
John v Germany also illustrates a hesitant and inconsistent attitude towards using the Article 
267(3) TFEU obligation in the reasoning of the ECtHR. The ECtHR assessed that the Hanseatic 
Court of Appeal had rightly substantiated its refusal on the fact that it was not a court 
adjudicating in last instance and thus not under an obligation to make a reference for a 
preliminary ruling deriving from Article 267 TFEU. However, as regards for the refusal of 
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Federal Court of Justice and Federal Constitutional Court, the ECtHR departed from further 
looking at the obligation in Article 267 TFEU. Contrary to the examination of the refusal of the 
Hanseatic Court of Appeal, the ECtHR did not consider the obligation of Article 267 TFEU. 
The ECtHR seemingly avoided to examine the refusals any further than agreeing with the 
national court on an obvious non- existence of an obligation. Although it would indeed not be 
within the jurisdiction of the ECtHR to examine whether the obligation of Article 267 TFEU 
applied in the specific case, an acknowledgement of the obligation while looking at the 
Hanseatic Court of Appeal but departing from it while looking at the Federal Court of Justice 
an addressee of the provision is problematic. 
3.3 Judgements decided on the merits  
Having examined the most notable decisions on admissibility, the few judgements that have 
been delivered by the ECtHR on refusals to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the 
CJEU will be looked upon. In decisions on admissibility the ECtHR did not distinguish between 
purely domestic and EU law when it comes to the material questions of the case when a 
reference for a preliminary ruling has been refused. As early as in 1958, it has been indicated 
that “if a State contracts treaty obligations and subsequently concludes another international 
agreement which disables it from performing its obligations under the first treaty, it will be 
answerable for any resulting breach of its obligations under the earlier treaty”.110 In the famous 
Bosphorus judgement111 it was elaborated that a State is responsible under the Convention 
regardless of whether the act or omission was  a consequence of domestic a resulted from the 
necessity to comply with an international obligation. The judgement stipulated that a  State may 
be held liable also for the violations as a result of implementation of EU law.112 In the context 
of a refusal to make a reference for a preliminary ruling this is perhaps best demonstrated in the 
admissibility decision Herma v Germany113  where the ECtHR expressly stated that it is for the 
national courts to interpret and apply domestic law “even when that law refers to international 
law or agreements” and the ECtHR limits itself solely to the effects of the latter and their 
compatibility of with the Convention114 thus confirming its respect for the exclusive right of 
the CJEU to interpret EU law. Since the first judgement on the merits was decided the ECtHR 
demonstrated that when it comes to procedural questions such as the obligation of Article 
267(3) TFEU the ECtHR recognizes the special legal regime of EU law. 
3.3.1. Adjusting the standard of non-arbitrariness to refusals under Article 267(3) TFEU 
The application in Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v Belgium115 was the first concerning the 
refusal to make a reference for preliminary ruling to the CJEU that was declared admissible and 
decided on the merits by the ECtHR. The judgement was delivered contrary to the widespread 
and well-founded view that it is very unlikely that the ECtHR would rule on the obligation 
under Article 267(3) TFEU in the context of Article 6 of the Convention.116 It did even more 
than that; the ECtHR established three additional criteria for assessing the standard of non- 
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arbitrariness by reviewing the relevant practice of the CJEU117 and substantiated its judgement 
on them, delving into the obligation under Article 276(3) TFEU and the CILFIT criteria.  
Ullens de Schooten arose from two applications that concerned the legal proceedings 
surrounding a clinical biology laboratory Biorim, whose clients were receiving reimbursement 
from the National Institute for Sickness and Invalidity for services from Biorim in violation of 
the Royal Degree no. 143 of 30. December 1982 (hereinafter Royal Degree). In the first 
application, the applicants, Mr. Ullens de Schooten and Mr. Rezabek who were directors of 
Biorim were convicted by the Brussels Court of First Instance and imposed prison sentences 
and fines.118 In their appeals to the Brussels Court of Appeals the applicants argued that the 
Royal Decree was incompatible with the EC Treaty and a reference for a preliminary ruling 
should be made to the CJEU on this matter. The Brussels Court of Appeals ruled that the Royal 
Decree was compatible with Community law and there was no need to make a reference for a 
preliminary ruling.119 The Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal against this decision. 
Meanwhile the applicants lodged a complaint against Belgium with the European Commission 
on the incompatibility of the Royal Decree with the EC Treaty. The Commission started 
infringement proceedings against Belgium for this matter and issued a reasoned opinion on this 
matter.120 While the infringement proceedings were pending, the applicants sought a 
preparatory hearing at the Mons Court of Appeal arguing that the Royal Decree was 
incompatible with the EC Treaty, supported by the Reasoned Opinion issued by the 
Commission and again requested that a reference for a preliminary ruling to be made. The Mons 
Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ arguments. The applicants again appealed to the 
Court of Cassation which subsequently dismissed their appeals. It argued that the res judicata 
doctrine allowed not to review a decision that was final under the domestic procedural rules, 
even though it appears to be in breach of EU law.121 The Court of Cassation accordingly refused 
to make a reference for a preliminary ruling based on act eclairé doctrine. A few months later 
Belgium amended the Royal Decree according to the reasoned opinion of the Commission.122 
The second application was made by Mr. Rezabek alone who challenged the administrative 
decision that suspended the accreditation of Biorim also on the basis of the Royal Decree.123 
The Royal Decree had already been amended when the matter reached the Counseil d’État. Mr. 
Rezabek disputed the compatibility of the Royal Decree with the EC Treaty and requested that 
a reference for a preliminary ruling be made. The Counseil d’État dismissed the appeals and 
refused to make a reference for a preliminary ruling. The Counseil d’État in its explanation 
expressly recognized its obligation under Article 267(3) TFEU and reiterated the three 
exceptions to that obligation. Relying on the material issue the Counseil d’Etat refused to make 
a reference for a preliminary ruling as it could not have affected the outcome of the case.124 
The ECtHR first recognized the main question before it, that is, whether the refusal by the Court 
of Cassation and the Conseil d’État to refer to the CJEU the questions submitted by the 
applicants for a preliminary ruling as requested by the applicants violated Article 6 of the 
Convention.125 The ECtHR acknowledged the “particular significance” of the preliminary 
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ruling procedure in the “jurisdictional context of the European Union” and its purpose to ensure 
the proper application and uniform interpretation of EU law and to prevent divergences in 
judicial decisions and questions of EU law.126 Then it observed that such an obligation arises 
from Article 267(3) TFEU and that exceptions for the obligation have been established in the 
CILFIT case- law, particularly, the relevance of the question  and the acte clair and act eclairé 
doctrines.127 
The ECtHR reiterated that “the Convention does not guarantee, as such, any right to have a case 
referred by a domestic court to another national or international authority for a preliminary 
ruling”. It went on that where in a legal system there exists a mechanism that only a particular 
court may interpret a particular field of law and other courts are required to refer questions of 
that field of law to that court, it is for the other courts to decide, according to the mechanism, 
whether a question needs to be referred or not when a request to do so is made.128 The passage 
obviously describes the preliminary ruling procedure between the national courts and the CJEU. 
The formulation emphasizes that it is “according to the mechanism (..) for the court to verify”129 
the need to make a reference for a preliminary ruling. Two conclusions can be made from this. 
First, the ECtHR acknowledges the in the decision to make a reference for a preliminary ruling 
under Article 276(3) TFEU should be made exclusively on the initiative of the courts and not 
parties to the proceedings.130 Secondly, by emphasizing the “legal mechanism” which governs 
the obligation to make references, it recognizes the importance of the EU legal regime also 
when deciding on refusals in the of Convention rights. 
That conclusion is supported by the fact that the ECtHR explicitly referred to the “particular 
significance [of the preliminary ruling procedure] in the jurisdictional context of the European 
Union” 131and expressly cited the CJEU on its importance in ensuring the proper application 
and interpretation and preventing divergences in judicial decisions on questions of Community 
law.132The ECtHR continued by stating that the fairness of the proceedings may be infringed, 
if the refusal proves arbitrary, that is, not accompanied by adequate reasons133 thus confirming 
the previously established requirement. However, it went on to specify that it may be so 
where there has been a refusal even though the applicable rules allow no exception to 
the principle of preliminary reference or no alternative thereto, where the refusal is 
based on reasons other than those provided for by the rules, and where the refusal has 
not been duly reasoned in accordance with those rules.134 
The ECtHR thus added three more criteria to assess the standard of non-arbitrariness. In context 
of Article 267(3) TFEU the court adjudicating in last instance is required to 
indicate the reasons why they have found that the question is irrelevant, that the 
European Union law provision in question has already been interpreted by the Court of 
Justice, or that the correct application of Community law is so obvious as to leave no 
scope for any reasonable doubt.135 
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The criteria undoubtedly correspond to the CILFIT criteria. Thus, a national court under the 
obligation of Article 267(3) TFEU must give reasons why a CILFIT criterion can be applied in 
the situation at hand.136  This specification to the standard of non- arbitrariness has been 
repeated in the following judgements almost verbatim.137 Having adjusted the standard of non- 
arbitrariness to refusals under Article 267(3) TFEU, the ECtHR found no arbitrariness in the 
refusals of Counseil d’État and the Court of Cassation.  
Although Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v Belgium marks an end to the reluctance of the 
ECtHR to put EU law into the equation, the judgement still demonstrates a great respect for the 
exclusive right of the CJEU to decide on the correct interpretation and application of EU law 
and its own limitation to evaluating only the fairness of proceedings according to the mentioned 
criteria.138In the circumstances where the European Commission had explicitly provided an 
answer and there was no question on whether the Counseil d’État could have relied on the 
exceptions of Article 267(3) TFEU, the ECtHR restrained itself from considering this matter 
entirely.  
The judgment allows to safely conclude that merely a reference to the CILFIT criteria and a 
reasonable justification for it excludes the possibility of a violation of Article 6 of the 
Convention139 A violation of the Convention may be committed if a reference to the CILFIT 
exceptions is entirely neglected.140 Moreover a reference to only and at least one of the CIFIT 
exceptions is sufficient, even in the circumstances where it is hard to determine the precise 
requirements for the reasoning in support to a reference to that exception.141 The question is 
still left uncertain, whether a refusal can be based on other reasons than a justified reference to 
at least one CILFIT exception.142 The answer is provided in the later Baydar143 judgement 
analyzed in below. 
3.3.2. The Dhahbi judgement -first violation of Article 6 of the Convention by a refusal 
to refer a question to the CJEU 
 The requirement to provide reasoning in the light of CILFIT criteria was applied in Dhahbi v 
Italy144 where the ECtHR first found a refusal to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to 
the CJEU to violate Article 6 of the Convention.145 
The case concerned an interpretation of the Association Agreement between the EU and Tunisia 
also known as the Euro-Mediterranean agreement, which prohibited discrimination based on 
the nationality of Tunisian nationals working in the EU and their families and allowed them to 
enjoy “social security” benefits just as EU citizens do. The applicant Mr. Dhahbi was a Tunisian 
national, lawfully working and residing in Italy with his family and three underaged children. 
Mr. Dhahbi was denied payment of the family allowance as Italian legislation made the 
allowance conditional inter alia on being an Italian national. Mr. Dhahbi complained that the 
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Italian legislation was in conflict with the Euro-Mediterranean agreement and in these 
circumstances, he was entitled to the family allowance. Alternatively, he requested the Italian 
courts to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU to ascertain whether the family 
allowance fell within the interpretation of “social security” and thus the scope of the Euro-
Mediterranean agreement. Having exhausted domestic remedies and without having received a 
preliminary ruling from the CJEU, the applicant made an application to the ECtHR claiming 
inter alia a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, as the Court of Cassation had refused to 
make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU although it was obliged to do so under 
Article 267(3) TFEU. 
The ECtHR easily recognized Article 267(3) TFEU to be applicable to the Court of Cassation 
as a court adjudicating as last instance and therefore recognized that it was required to provide 
reasoning in the light of the exceptions provided in the case- law of the CJEU146 that is, the 
CILFT criteria. Mr. Dhahbi had provided extensive argumentation to substantiate the 
applicability of the Euro-Mediterranean agreement to the Italian legislation on family benefits 
or at least prove uncertainty on this matter. Mr. Dhahbi referred to the case- law of the CJEU 
where it had recognized the direct applicability of principle of non-discrimination in the field 
of social security, the interpretation of which had been sufficiently broad, in context of the 
agreement between EU and Morocco. Mr. Dhahbi argued that this argumentation was “fully 
transposable” to the situation at hand.147 Even more, he argued that the Court of Cassation had 
ignored the meaning of “social assistance” in EU law and its relevance to the principle of non-
discrimination, supported by extensive case- law of the CJEU.148 
The ECtHR found that the Court of Cassation had not substantiated its refusal by any of the 
three exceptions of Article 267(1) TFEU. Even more, the reasoning of the Court of Cassation 
had not considered the argumentation of the applicant. Nor had it made any reference to the 
case- law of the CJEU; the ECtHR thus concluded that it is “not clear from the reasoning of the 
impugned judgment whether that question was considered not to be relevant or to relate to a 
provision which was clear or had already been interpreted by the CJEU, or whether it was 
simply ignored.”149 The ECtHR thus ruled that “[t]hat finding is sufficient for the Court to 
conclude, that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.”150 
3.3.3. Developments after Dhahbi 
Having first decided a refusals to make a reference for a preliminary ruling on the merits and 
having first found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, the ECtHR delivered two more 
such judgements. 
Schipani and Others v Italy151 concerned late transposition of an EU directive, which had 
deprived the applicants, all of them trainee doctors, from remuneration that was provided in 
that directive. The applicants sought to obtain compensation for damage sustained, which was 
dismissed by the Rome Court of First Instance and Rome Court of Appeal. The applicants 
appealed to the Court of Cassation and inter alia requested to refer two questions to the CJEU. 
It must be noted that the applicants made the request in alternative to the immediate satisfaction 
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of their claims. The Court of Cassation upheld the judgement of the Rome Court of Appeal and 
made no reference whatsoever to the request to refer a question to the CJEU of the applicants.152 
The ECtHR found that the Court of Cassation did not refer to the applicants request or state any 
reasons why the questions should not be submitted to the CJEU in its judgment. Although the 
government had argued that its argumentation in the substance of its judgement implicitly 
provided reasoning for the first question of the applicants, it was enough for the ECtHR that 
the second question was left unaddressed.153 The ECtHR thus found that “the statement of 
reasons for the judgment at issue does not therefore make it possible whether this last branch 
of the question was considered irrelevant or as relating to a clear provision or as already 
interpreted by the ECJ, or if it has simply been ignored (..)”154 thereby finding a violation of 
Article 6 of the Convention. The ECtHR dismissed the argument of the Government that the 
reasons for the refusal are indirectly apparent from the material solution of the case and did not 
addressed such possibility in principle.155 
Notably the alternative nature of the request was not considered by the ECtHR, unlike in 
Krikorian v France. Considering that the ECtHR did the same in John v Germany it may be 
safely assumed that after Schipani this circumstance is not relevant for the ECtHR and its 
consideration in Krikorian v France was rather a one-time exception with authority (or absence 
of it) of obiter dicta. 
Moreover, it can be concluded that the ECtHR requires national courts to provide reasoning for 
refusal for all and each question mentioned in the request of the applicants. However, this 
conclusion still requires confirmation in further case- law. The Government alleged that 
motivation for refusing the first question was implicitly provided in the discussion on material 
questions of the case. The ECtHR continued the examination on this premise only “supposing 
that this is the case”156. It is arguable whether this kind of reasoning even met the requirement 
to provide reasons when taken separately.  
More light is shed on this question in the judgement Wind Telcomunicazioni SPA. v Italy157. 
This case concerned a particularly fascinating situation. The applicant, a limited liability 
company Wind Telcomunicazioni SPA had been imposed a fine of 2 00 000 for a breach of EU 
competition rules. The applicant challenged the respective administrative decision in the 
Regional Administrative Court which rejected the appeal. Wind Telcomunicazioni SPA then 
brought the case to the Council of State and inter alia requested that a reference for a 
preliminary ruling on the interpretation of EU competition rules be made to the CJEU. The 
Council of State rejected the appeal and provided an answer to the question referring to the 
case- law of CJEU. The applicant appealed against this decision in the Court of Cassation 
alleging that the Council of State had provided its own interpretation of EU competition rules 
thereby acting outside its jurisdiction and had an obligation according to Article 267 TFEU  to 
make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU.158 The Court of Cassation rejected the 
appeal as manifestly ill-founded  and the applicant brought the question to the Supreme Court 
and requested to refer a the following questions to the CJEU, first, if Article 267 TFEU must 
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be interpreted in the sense to attribute to the CJEU exclusive jurisdiction in matters of 
interpretation of EU law and, second,  if a national court of last instance exceeded the limits of 
their jurisdiction refusing to make a refer a question to the CJEU and  giving its own 
interpretation of  EU law.159 The Supreme Court rejected the complaint. The applicant 
formulated its complaint to the ECtHR in a broad manner, that “the procedure for its appeal 
against the decision [imposing the fine] has not been fair” 160 without identifying the precise 
stage of proceedings.  
The ECtHR thereby was in the unenviable situation where it had to rule on the fairness of 
proceedings that concerned a rejection to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU 
which was itself on the obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling procedure and 
even more the delimitation of competences of national courts and the CJEU in EU law. The 
ECtHR declared the complaint in the part of the rejection of the Council of State inadmissible 
as being lodged out of time. As for the Court of Cassation, the ECtHR reiterated the requirement 
to provide reasoning in the light of exceptions of Article 267(3) TFEU. It then observed that no 
the requests of the applicant had not been addressed in any way in the judgement of the Court 
of Cassation. Despite this fact the ECtHR then stated that “it appears from a reading of the 
reasoning in that judgment that the question was manifestly irrelevant in this case”161 agreeing 
with the findings of the Supreme Court.162 The ECtHR stated that “[a]dmittedly, it would have 
been preferable for the Court of Cassation to explain the lines of its reasoning”163 but accepted 
that the court’s reasoning could be sufficiently implied 164 and found no violation of Article 6 
of the Convention. 
It can be safely argued that the ECtHR failed to refrain from interpretation of EU law. Although 
it did so by agreeing to the interpretation of the Supreme Court, in effect the ECtHR concluded 
that the first exception of Article 267(3) TFEU applied in the case. From the examined case- 
law, Wind Telcomunicazioni SPA. v Italy demonstrates an occasion where the fine line that 
divides the jurisdictions of ECtHR and CJEU has been overstepped. 
Moreover, in Wind Telcomunicazioni SPA. v Italy the ECtHR accepted that reasoning for a 
rejection can also be implicitly provided in the examination of the material questions of the 
judgement. Criticism has been raised that by this approach the ECtHR itself searched for the 
excuse to rule that sufficient reasoning had been provided.165  
Whereas the ECtHR seemed not to accept such an option in Schipani and Others v Italy, it 
confidently did so in Wind Telcomunicazioni SPA. v Italy. It should be noted that the material 
issue and the argumentation provided in both cases differed considerably. It is very questionable 
if the argumentation of the Court of Cassation in Schipani and Others v Italy could be 
sufficiently linked to the question of the applicants. By contrast, in Wind Telcomunicazioni 
SPA. v Italy the argumentation of the Court of Cassation and the applicant’s questions 
undoubtedly concerned the same underlying legal issue. It can be concluded that it is not 
entirely impossible that the ECtHR finds that although reasoning for a refusal is not provided 
explicitly, it can be implied from the examination of material issues of the case, therefore not 
violating Article 6 of the Convention. However, such situation requires a very close connection 
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between the explanation of the material issues and the question that the applicants requested to 
refer to the CJEU. 
3.3.4. Softening of the requirement to provide reasoning  
The requirement to provide reasoning that had been applied and specified in the case- law of 
the ECtHR was nevertheless limited in the recent judgment Baydar v The Netherlands166 of 24 
July 2018. In this case the applicant had not included a request to make a reference for a 
preliminary ruling in the written submissions to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands but only 
in reply to the Advocate’s General advisory opinion during the domestic proceedings. The 
Supreme Court dismissed the request by a summary reasoning within its judgement, which was 
limited to a recognition that the “[c]ounsel [for the applicant] have submitted a written reply” 
and the following passage:  
The grievances cannot lead to cassation [of the impugned judgement]. Based on Section 
81(1) of the Judiciary Act this requires no further reasoning as the remaining grievances 
do not give rise to the need for a determination of legal issues in the interests of legal 
uniformity or legal development.167  
The applicant complained that the refusal was insufficiently substantiated, thus arbitrary and in 
violation of Article 6 of the Convention. Unlike in previous judgements and decisions where 
the ECtHR had expanded or specified the requirement to provide reasons, the ECtHR in Baydar 
did the opposite. After the ECtHR reiterated that a refusal may be deemed arbitrary if not 
examined in the light of the exceptions of Article 267(3) TFEU it continued that it, however, 
the obligation to provide reasoning does not mean that a court must provide a “detailed answer 
to every argument”168 The submissions that can be brought before the court are diverse and 
therefore the extent of the duty to provide reasons may vary and can be determined only in the 
light of the circumstances of the case.169 Such circumstances that allow exceptions to the 
requirement to provide reasoning were, for instance, established in John v Germany170 (see 
chapters on fundamental legal issue and sufficient substantiation). Thereby the ECtHR has 
“softened the obligation to give reasons”171 if the decision makes a reference for a preliminary 
ruling unnecessary.172  
As for the summary reasoning, the ECtHR recalled that it had accepted that a request may be 
dismissed by mere reference to the relevant legal provisions if matter raises no fundamentally 
important legal issue and to dismiss an appeal on points of law as having no prospects of success 
without further explanation.173 In these circumstances, as the case was decided in accelerated 
proceedings174 and the applicant’s grounds for appeal and Advocate General’s advisory 
opinion175 had been properly examined, the ECtHR accepted that the summary reasoning 
implied that “a referral to the CJEU could not lead to a different outcome of the case” and thus 
demonstrated the irrelevance of the question, the first CILFIT criterion. 176 Having limited but 
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not jeopardized its strict rules on the duty to provide reasoning177 the ECtHR found no violation 
of Article 6 § of the Convention by the Supreme Court’s refusal. 
Although the Baydar judgement might seem like a sudden departure from the established case- 
law on the requirement to provide reasoning in the context of the CILFIT exceptions, such a 
path had been advocated for and explained by such authorities as Morten Bromberg and Niels 
Fenger approximately two years earlier.178 The authors had pointed at the faulty assumption 
that in all cases when national courts reject the applicants requests to refer a question to the 
CJEU they automatically do not live up to the requirements of the Convention. Morten 
Bromberg and Niels Fenger argued that “the fact that a party generally and imprecisely asks for 
the relevant provisions of EU law to be put before the Court of Justice can hardly mean that the 
national court must give an extensive statement of reasons for refusing to make a reference.”179 
Moreover the authors suggested that existence of sufficient reasoning should be assessed in 
context of the whole judgement, that is the refusal and the judgement should  “together [be] 
clear about the circumstances to which the court has given weight for refusing to make a 
reference” which may or may not include examination of the applicability of the CILFIT 
exceptions.180	
4. CASE- LAW OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 
To put the case- law of the ECtHR in the context of the jurisprudence of the CJEU two separate 
perspectives need to be distinguished. First, from the perspective of State liability and the 
obligation of a Member State to provide remedy to an individual for breach of EU rights, in 
particular by the judiciary. Second, from the perspective of infringement proceedings against 
the Member State brought by the Commission due to the conduct of the judiciary and 
particularly, failure to fulfil the obligation of Article 267(3) TFEU.  
4.1 State liability 
The EU is an independent legal system whose subjects are not only its Member States but also 
the citizens of the Union. EU law confers rights to individuals. The Member States are required 
to take all appropriate measures to fulfil the obligations arising out of the Treaties181 which 
include the obligation to “nullify the unlawful consequences”182 of a breach of EU law. In order 
to protect these rights and to ensure overall enforcement of EU law, individuals are given a 
possibility to bring a legal action against a Member State to seek remedy for a failure to 
implement, or correctly apply EU law.183 It has been recognized as inherent in the system of 
Treaties that Member States must provide individual remedy for loss and damage sustained due 
to a violation of EU law that the Member State can be held liable for it.184 The national courts 
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in particular must ensure that EU law takes full effect and the rights of individuals conferred 
by it are protected.   
Despite national procedural autonomy,185 the principle of effectiveness and the principle of 
equivalence need to be respected. According to the principle of equivalence national procedural 
rules must not make enforcement of EU law rights more difficult than national law rights.186 
Nor, according to the principle of effectiveness, may the procedural rules make it excessively 
difficult or virtually impossible to enforce EU law rights. 187 The Court of Justice has held that 
it is for the Member States to designate within their internal legal order the competent courts 
and procedural rules for deciding on individual remedy for loss and damage due to violations 
of their rights in EU law rights by the state.188 Assigning a competent court to rule on State 
liability has been difficult.189 Possible solutions depend on the judicial architecture of each 
Member State but generally require setting up a separate court for this purpose or designating 
a court within the existing system.190 The latter might lead to the situation where the same 
higher court is supposed to decide a case where it is a judge and a party at the same time or 
where a lower court should be a judge for a higher court’s work, which is “unfortunate from 
the point of view of the hierarchy of the court system”.191 Nonetheless the CJEU has not given 
any further guidance and the case- law examined further leads to the conclusion that it is the 
lower courts who usually are left to decide on the Member State arising from a higher court’s 
judgement. 
The principle of State liability in is not established in the founding Treaties nor any other EU 
legal acts, but has rather been developed in the case- law of the CJEU based on the basis of the 
principles of effectiveness and sincere cooperation.192 Over the years, State liability has evolved 
to be able to originate from the conduct of all branches of power, first, the legislature, second, 
the executive and most recently – the judiciary. Only then, the case-law had evolved to 
accepting that a failure to make a preliminary reference by courts of last instance could invoke 
State liability. However as further demonstrated, the established case- law on State liability 
seems to be unsuited for providing a remedy to individuals for breaches of Article 267(3) TFEU 
and thus very limited for analysis in context of Article 6 of the Convention. 
4.1.2 Criteria for State liability 
In 1991 the CJEU first established the principle of State liability in the Francovich193 judgement 
thereby providing a possibility for an individual to claim loss or damage resulting from failure 
of a Member State to comply with EU obligations. Accommodation of State liability completed 
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the regime of protection of individual rights under EU law.194 It complemented the existing 
principles of direct and indirect effect for that end195 by solving the difficulties generated by 
the lack of horizontal effect of EU law.196 
In Francovich the CJEU set three criteria to determine whether reparation should be awarded 
to an individual for loss or damage in case of breach of Community law: (a) the rule of law 
infringed must be intended to confer rights upon individuals; (b) the breach must be sufficiently 
serious; and (c) there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting 
on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties.197 If these three criteria are fulfilled 
an individual may seek compensation directly from the Member State.198  
Year 1996 brought considerable developments to the principle of State liability. In the Joint 
Brasserie and Facorame cases199 the CJEU set the following factors that should be considered 
when determining whether a breach of EU law has been sufficiently serious200 that is : (1) the 
clarity and precision of the rule that has been breached; (2) the measure of discretion left to the 
national authorities; (3) whether the infringement was intentional or voluntary; (4) whether the 
error was excusable; and (5) the position taken by the EU authorities.201 Upon setting these 
criteria, the Court rejected the possibility to make reparation conditional on the existence of 
intentional or negligent fault which is often a prerequisite at the national level. The Court 
rejected this because the concept of fault “does not have the same content in various legal 
systems” and it may be relevant only in determining whether the breach of Community law is 
sufficiently serious.202 
The criteria established in Francovich and elaborated in Brasserie and Factorame have been 
universally applied when the breach is attributable to the legislative branch as well as the 
executive branch, which was first found in 1996 in the Hedley Lomas203 case. The criteria, with 
a slight variance, also allowed to establish State liability where the breach was attributable to 
the judicial branch as provided further on. The two landmark judgements- Köbler and Ferreira 
da Silva judgements, where the breach originated from the judicial branch, will be further 
analyzed in detail.  
4.1.3 The Köbler judgement 
State liability for a breach attributable to the judiciary was established in 2003 in the Köbler204 
judgement which was called “revolutionary”205 and “a turning point (..) for the European 
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dimension of state liability”.206 Following the Opinion of Advocate General Philippe Léger207 
the CJEU established for the first time that also the courts of Member States can in principle 
create liability for the Member State for infringements of Community law.208 
Mr. Köbler who had been employed as a university professor under a public law contract in 
Innsbruck, Austria applied for the special length-of-service increment to his remuneration, 
which was available to university professors employed by an Austrian state university for more 
than 15 years. Mr. Köbler argued that he would meet the 15-year pre-requisite if his service in 
universities in other Member States were considered and limiting the 15-year pre-requisite 
solely to Austrian state universities would constitute an indirect discrimination and interfere 
with the free movement of persons. 
The Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Supreme Administrative Court) made a request for a preliminary 
reference to the CJEU but later withdrew it on the basis of acte éclairé, which was later declared 
to be a misinterpretation. Mr. Köbler then brought an action before the Landesgericht für 
Zivilrechtssachen Wien (Regional Civil Court, Vienna) to declare liability of the Republic of 
Austria for a breach of Community law by the judgement of the Verwaltungsgerichtshof. The 
Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien made a preliminary reference to the CJEU asking 
inter alia whether State liability can be invoked by a decision of a national court of last instance.  
Having established criteria for State liability and further clarified the standard of “sufficiently 
serious” breach in Brasserie and Factorame209, the Court in adjusted its reasoning to the judicial 
branch. The CJEU indicated that State liability due to a decision of a national court of last 
instance can be incurred “only in the exceptional case where the court has manifestly infringed 
the applicable law.”210 Whether the criteria of a “manifest infringement” are met depends on 
“all the factors which characterize the situation put before [the court of last instance]”.211  
Notably, this reflection did not mention an infringement in the form of a failure to request a 
preliminary reference. The fact that the national court had failed to make a reference for a 
preliminary ruling under Article 267(3) TFEU was not found by the Court to be “sufficiently 
serious” that is a “manifest infringement” in context of the judicial branch.  
Rather, the compliance (or non- compliance) with the obligation to make a reference for a 
preliminary ruling was mentioned as one of the factors for determining whether the 
infringement of the national court of last instance is “manifest”.212 The CJEU assessed the 
misinterpretation of Community law 213 rather than the failure to make a reference for a 
preliminary ruling which caused the misinterpretation. Nonetheless, the wording of this 
conclusion undoubtedly left such a possibility open for future cases, as it did not rule out such 
a possibility but made such a conclusion “in the present case”.214 
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4.1.4 The Ferreira da Silva judgement 
In the Ferreira da Silva judgment215 João Filipe Ferreira da Silva and ninety-six other 
Portuguese citizens were dismissed by their employer, Air Atlantis SA (hereinafter “AIA”), an 
air transport company, which was subject to liquidation while the business in fact was 
transferred to its largest shareholder TAP. Ferreira da Silva and others claimed that their 
dismissal violated EU law, which provides that in case of a transfer of business the transferors 
rights and obligations including those of employment relationships must be transferred to the 
transferee. 
After lower instance courts had issued conflicting judgements the matter came before the 
Supremo Tribunal de Justica (Supreme Court). The applicants requested to make a preliminary 
reference to the CJEU but was refused by the Supremo Tribunal de Justica, which held that 
according to the settled case-law of the CJEU no scope was left for reasonable doubt.216 
Unsatisfied, the applicants brought an action in Varas Civeis de Lisboa (Court of first instance 
of Lisbon) against the Portuguese state claiming damages and material loss sustained, 
submitting inter alia that the refusal to make a request for a preliminary reference breached 
Article 267(3) TFEU.  In this situation the Varas Civeis de Lisboa submitted a question to the 
CJEU asking inter alia whether the Supremo Tribunal de Justica had an obligation to make a 
preliminary reference.  
The Court easily found that the matter gave rise to a “great deal of uncertainty”, leaving no 
possibility to apply the acte clair doctrine and declared that in these circumstances the Supremo 
Tribunal de Justica had an obligation under Article 267(3) TFEU to make a reference for a 
preliminary ruling. The Court for the first time declared that a supreme court or any type of 
court adjudicating in last instance had not complied with the obligation to make a reference for 
a preliminary ruling.  
4.1.5 State liability for a breach of Article 267(3) TFEU 
Although these criteria have been employed to establish State liability for a breach by the 
judicial branch, they are unsuitable for finding a breach of Article 267(3) TFEU.217 The first 
criterion is not met-according to its wording, the addressee of Article 267(3) TFEU is the 
national court adjudicating in last instance not the individual.218  
It has been argued that the CJEU in Köbler acknowledged “a subjective dimension within the 
preliminary ruling mechanism”219 and an essential tool for the judicial protection of rights of 
individuals granted by EU law which was confirmed in Ferreira da Silva.220 The latter however 
relates to the preliminary ruling mechanism as such221 and not Article 267(3) TFEU.  
The preliminary ruling procedure certainly has a positive impact for individuals before national 
courts when encountered a problem of EU law. It allows to receive a judgement from the 
                                               
215 Judgement of 9 September 2015, João Filipe Ferreira da Silva e Brito and Others v Estado português, C-
160/14, EU:C:2015:565, pp. 4-14. 
216 Ibid, pp. 16-17. 
217 Bromberg, supra note 49, p. 249. 
218 Sedlova, supra note 37, p. 212. 
219 Alessandra Silveira Sophie Perez Fernandez, “Preliminary References, Effective Judicial Protection and State 
Liability. What if the Ferreira da Silva Judgment Had not Been Delivered?” Revista de Derecho Comunitario 
Europeo 54 (2016): p. 649. 
220 Ibid, p. 652. 
221 Siegbert Gatawis, Edmunds Broks, Zane Bule, Eiropas Tiesības (Rīga:  Latvijas Universitāte, 2002), p.148. 
  31 
national court that is correct from the point of view of EU law which is definitely desirable for 
the individual222thereby providing an opportunity to get around the strict requirements of locus 
standi for direct actions before the CJEU.223  However the subjective dimension as developed 
to date does not reach as far as a basis for individual remedy. The main aim of the preliminary 
ruling procedure remains to facilitate judicial dialogue. The relationship between the CJEU and 
the national courts is cooperative not hierarchical, making the preliminary ruling procedure a 
form of conversation between the courts and not a possibility for an appeal to the 
individual.224The decision to make a reference for a preliminary ruling should be independent 
from any initiative from the parties.225 Moreover Article 267(3) TFEU is a procedural norm, 
which is not able to create State liability by definition as argued by Claus Dieter Classen.226 All 
of these arguments are supported by the fact that no situation has been identified where a failure 
to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU has resulted in a reparation being paid 
to a private party under EU law.227 For these reasons, unless substantial changes are made by 
the CJEU to the existing preliminary ruling mechanism, a breach of Article 267(3) TFEU 
cannot result in State liability. 
4.1.6 Parallels 
Analysis of the parallels between the Köbler and Ferreira da Silva cases lead to the aspect of 
State liability that can be viewed in the context of Article 6 of the Convention. As established 
in Köbler,  whether a question had been addressed to the CJEU is a decisive factor for finding 
a “manifest infringement” by the judicial branch and thus invoking State liability and the 
obligation to pay reparation.228 A parallel examination of both cases suggests that the manner 
and motivation in which the national court decided not to make a reference for a preliminary 
ruling is decisive in this matter and furthermore corresponds to the standard of non- 
arbitrariness and the requirement to provide reasoning as required under Article 6 of the 
Convention. 
In Ferreira da Silva the Varas Civeis de Lisboa found itself in a similar situation to the 
Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien in Köbler. In both cases the lower national courts 
were to decide whether a national supreme court had infringed EU law. Varas Civeis de Lisboa 
followed the example of Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen Wien to avoid the risk of 
erroneous application of EU law and made a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU.229 
The parallels do not end here. In both cases the Verwaltungsgerichtshof and the Supremo 
Tribunal de Justica were under an obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling as 
courts adjudicating in last instance but in both cases they failed to do so. What differed was the 
ability of such a failure to contribute to invoking State liability. The Verwaltungsgerichtshof 
initially submitted a reference but later withdrew it due to misreading of a previous judgement 
of the Court. The Supremo Tribunal de Justica, however, ruled out such option by rejecting a 
request to do so by the applicants without much consideration. This crucial difference led to 
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different outcomes as well. Following the criteria, it had established, the Court found that the 
failure of the Supremo Tribunal de Justica to request a preliminary reference could not be 
characterized as “manifest” and thus “sufficiently serious”. There was no intention of the 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof to evade its obligation.  That seems to have played a decisive role in 
this outcome.230 It was the opposite for the Supremo Tribunal de Justica, in case of which the 
intention to evade its obligation was undoubtedly “manifest” and thus “sufficiently serious”. 
Indeed, according to the opinion of Advocate General Jacobs the Köbler case a Member State 
will be held liable in case of bad faith231 and it has been suggested that an explanation why the 
national court considered a reference for a preliminary ruling superfluous reduces the risk of 
finding State liability.232  
This conclusion allows an examination from the point of view of Article 6 of the Convention. 
Consideration of the subjective attitude of the national court suggests again a complementary 
relationship with the standard of non- arbitrariness. If the CJEU evaluates the subjective attitude 
of the national court that had failed to make a reference for a preliminary ruling when 
contemplating the manifest nature of the breach, the presence of reasoning, especially such 
based on the CILFIT exceptions obviously is also considered. A thorough examination of the 
applicability of the CILFIT criteria is decisive both for finding a refusal not arbitrary and a 
breach of Article 267(3) TFEU not “manifest”. The existence of a complementary relationship 
has been supported also by Morten Bromberg, who has concluded that “the fact that a national 
court (..) may be held to be in breach of Article 6(1) of the ECHR if [it] fails to make a 
preliminary reference without giving sufficient grounds, may form an important impetus 
towards better compliance”233 
4.2 An action by the European Commission against a Member State 
An action brought by the Commission against a Member State is one of the procedural actions 
available before the CJEU234 whereby the Commission acting in the general interest of the 
EU235 ensures compliance by Member States with EU law. Unlike for State liability, an action 
against the Member State under Articles 258-260 TFEU can be initiated by the European 
Commission for any infringement of EU law or failure to act236 and eventually bring the matter 
to the CJEU which determines whether the Member State is in breach or not237 and may impose 
a financial penalty.238 Controversially, that applies also to breaches committed by national 
courts including supreme courts. A failure to make a reference for a preliminary ruling under 
Article 267(3) TFEU is also an infringement that may cause an action against a Member 
State.239 
The first infringement proceedings that found a failure to fulfil EU law obligations involving 
the judiciary was the Commission v Italy240 judgement. The infringement proceedings were 
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initiated regarding Italian legislation on repayment of taxes that are levied contrary to 
Community law, a practice that had been approved by the Italian courts following a doctrine 
upheld by the Corte suprema di cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation). Although the 
decision of the Court recognizes the contribution of the Corte suprema di cassazione to the 
failure to fill obligations of Community law, it is not a judgement or procedural error of that 
court that gave rise to the case. 
A purely judicial infringement241 followed six years later in Commission v Spain242 Even more, 
it was committed by decision of a national supreme court and an overall doctrine confirmed by 
a number of decisions.243 The Court agreed with the Commission and found an erroneous 
interpretation of a Directive244 by judgement of Tribunal Supremo (Supreme Court of Spain) 
which resulted in breach by Spain of the Sixth VAT Directive245. Notably, the Tribunal 
Supremo had decided made the impugned decision without making a preliminary reference, 
clearly failing to meet its obligation set in Article 267 TFEU. The Commission initially included 
this aspect in the complaint against Spain but abandoned it later before the Court.246 Standing 
on the established jurisprudence of Commission v Italy and Commission v Spain, the CJEU in 
late 2018 found the first judicial infringement specifically in the form of breach of Article 
267(3) TFEU in the Commission v France247 judgement. 
5. THE COMMISSION V FRANCE JUDGEMENT  
The Commission v France judgment was delivered contrary to the observation that the practice 
of the Commission has been “reluctant”248  and shown “very considerable constraint” 249 for 
prosecuting Member States for infringements of Article 267(3) TFEU.  Uneasy predictions, that 
the Commission would thereafter be allowed to “police the judgements of national courts”250 
had been expressed after the first judicial infringement was found in Commission v Spain251 
judgement while an infringement proceedings for the failure to fulfil obligations under Article 
267(3) TFEU were considered only hypothetical, 252 due to being not only legally but also 
politically difficult.253 Increasing competences of the EU have been recognized to increase the 
risk of “jurisdictional and normative overlaps” 254 that might result in an EU Member State 
becoming a defendant in Strasbourg when the issue arises from EU law.255 Although the 
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Commission v France judgement arguably does not mark an increase of competences of the EU 
rather the enforcement of the existing Treaty provisions, it is relevant to examine it in this 
context due to the sensitivity of the situation when the ECtHR must adjudicate on the fairness 
of the proceedings which allegedly breach of Article 267(3) TFEU.  
The Commission v France case arose from the Commission’s action to for failure to fulfil 
obligations against the French Republic due to a series of judgements of the Conseil d’État 
(Council of State). On substance the case concerned French legislation that was intended to 
eliminate double taxation of dividends. According to the French rules a parent company was 
able to set off against the advance payment of tax applicable to the dividends distributed by 
subsidiaries to their parent companies. The Accor256 judgement in 2011, arising from a 
preliminary reference of the Conseil d’État, ruled that limiting the rules to dividends distributed 
by subsidiaries established in France was contrary to Articles 49 and 63 TFEU. The matter 
returned to the Conseil d’État which delivered two judgements Rhodia257 and Accor258 based 
on the preliminary ruling. However, in these judgements the Conseil d’État ruled on an aspect 
that was not addressed by the Court of Justice, that is, the applicability of the rules to dividends 
distributed by sub-subsidiaries established in other Member States.  
At the time when Conseil d’État issued these judgements the Court of Justice had just ruled on 
the same aspect of rules on taxation in relation to the United Kingdom in the Test Claimants259 
case. Nonetheless, considering the differences in the British and French systems of corporate 
taxation, the Conseil d’État decided not to follow the approach of the Test Claimants. After the 
Conseil d’État had issued the judgements, the Commission received a number of complaints 
from French undertakings receiving dividends from their subsidiaries in other Member States 
which, according to Rhodia and Accor judgements, were unable to benefit from the rules on 
taxation of dividends.260 The Commission brought an action for failure to fulfil obligations, 
raising a number of complaints, inter alia, for an infringement of Article 267(3) TFEU.  
The Court rather easily, with a short analysis in only ten paragraphs, agreed with the 
Commission and found that Conseil d’État “failed to make a reference to the Court in 
accordance with the procedure provided for in the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU.”261 
The Court of Justice found for the first time that by failure to make a reference for a preliminary 
ruling of a national court adjudicating in last instance a Member State had failed to fulfil its 
obligations under Article 267(3) TFEU.262 In the context of the development of case-law 
previously analyzed, the result of Commission v France is not a revolution but rather a logical 
continuation. 
Nonetheless, the supporting argumentation may be considered more controversial than the 
outcome of the case itself. The Court found that the Conseil d’État had wrongly relied on the 
acte clair doctrine. The supporting argumentation is twofold. First, the Conseil d’État had 
insufficiently explained the precise differences between the tax systems of France and the 
United Kingdom. Consequently, it could not be certain that its choice to rule contrary to Test 
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Claimants would be equally obvious to the Court263 and thus could not rely on the acte clair 
doctrine and avoid making a request for a preliminary ruling.264 Second and controversially, 
the Court argued that the fact that the Conseil d’État, by adopting a solution in Rhodia and 
Accor judgements that was “at variance with that of the present judgement” had implied the 
existence of a reasonable doubt.265  
As identified by Vincent Delhomme and Lucie Larripa,266 such argumentation is problematic. 
It suggests that Conseil d’État, at the time when its judgements were delivered, should have 
foreseen the difference in outcome with the judgement of the Court of Justice, which had not 
yet been delivered. Recalling the CILFIT criteria, it would allow to disprove that a matter 
“leaves no scope for reasonable doubt” and is “equally obvious”267 to the Court of Justice by 
merely a contrary judgement of the Court. On one hand such reasoning it is logical. The 
question whether the Court of Justice finds a solution equally obvious is best proved by the 
Court of Justice itself, and, by only option, a contrary judgement. On the other hand, in effect 
this argumentation requires the national courts adjudicating in the last instance to compare their 
solution to one that has not yet been expressed by the Court of Justice. Not only logically 
impossible, it dismantles the very limited discretion that national courts have when deciding 
whether to apply the acte clair doctrine. It can never be entirely ruled out that the Court might 
choose a contrary solution to that in mind of the national courts adjudicating in last instance. 
To prove that the matter is “equally obvious” the national court would have no other choice 
than to make a reference for a preliminary ruling, rendering the acte clair doctrine meaningless, 
at least from purely logical standpoint. In much more delicate wording, as identified by Frederik 
Behre,268 this reasoning could be translated as emphasizing the importance of the obligation of 
Article 267(3) TFEU. According to Daniel Sarmiento,269 it is a “clear signal” that departure 
from the case-law of the Court of Justice by national courts adjudicating in last instance will 
result in an infringement proceedings brought by the Commission. The middle ground is offered 
by Delhomme and Larripa who see this reasoning as a “powerful incentive for supreme courts 
to systematically refer questions [to the Court of Justice]”.270 Such scenario might be the most 
realistic consequence of the acte clair doctrine becoming meaningless to apply in theory or 
posing a considerably higher risk of committing a breach of Article 276(3) TFEU in practice.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS  
The ECtHR has only recently admitted an application concerning the refusal to make a 
reference for preliminary ruling to the CJEU and decided it on the merits. Ullens de Schooten 
and Rezabek v Belgium, the first such judgement, and the subsequent development of case- law 
demonstrates that the ECtHR distinguishes the preliminary ruling procedure of Article 267 (3) 
TFEU from preliminary questions to other national or international courts and tribunals and 
respects the particularities of the EU legal regime. 
When an alleged violation of Article 267(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union comes before the European Court of Human Rights it faces three difficulties. First, it 
must not to overstep the dividing line of jurisdiction between itself and the Court of Justice of 
the European Union, both of which are entitled to rule on different but not entirely delimited 
aspects of the situation. Second, it ought to maintain consistency or at least compatibility with 
the applicable rules of European Union law. Thirdly, it should not compromise the strict regime 
for protection of the right to a fair trial. These difficulties are reflected in the requirements and 
attitude found in the case- law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
The division of competences between the ECtHR and CJEU when a national court is in breach 
Article 267(3) TFEU prima facie seems clear. The ECtHR examines the interaction between 
the parties and the national court. EU law rules on the preliminary ruling procedure are 
completely detached from this matter and concern the interaction between different actors, the 
national court and the CJEU and specifically exclude the individual from the equation. it 
concerns an interaction between actors from which EU law deliberately disassociates itself. The 
CJEU views the preliminary ruling procedure as an instrument for dialogue between the CJEU 
and national courts for the purpose of ensuring proper application and uniform interpretation of 
EU law. The CJEU has repeatedly reiterated that is entirely up to the national courts to decide 
whether to make a reference for a preliminary ruling and should distance this decision from any 
initiative of the parties. This allows to conclude that not only the actors concerned by the law 
applied by both courts are different, but the CJEU further emphasizes the irrelevance of the 
matter that lies in the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. 
Despite this theoretically clear division of competences, in reality it is hard to sustain, as 
demonstrated in the case- law of ECtHR. Perhaps also due to this reason as well the ECtHR has 
occaisinally struggled to maintain consistency. It has been so with the requirement of the 
applicant to make a self- standing not alternative request (see the Krikorian v France and the 
subsequent John v Germany and Schipani) or the lack of clarity when the applicant’s 
substantiation of a request is deemed sufficient to require the court to provide reasons for a 
refusal (see chapter 3.2.2). 
On one hand, one might find the requirements for the applicant in making a request to the 
national court of last instance inherently contradictory to the spirit of the preliminary ruling 
procedure. The obligation under Article 267(3) TFEU applies only to the national court and 
should in no way be dependent on the initiative of the parties. On the other hand, such 
contradiction is inevitable- as already mentioned, in order not to overstep its jurisdiction, the 
ECtHR must occupy itself with the relationship between the national court and the individual 
which is irrelevant under Article 267(3) TFEU. A logical outcome of concern for different 
actors in the situation, this phenomenon appears to have no harmful effect. 
The ECtHR has successfully maneuvered not to overstep the dividing line between the its 
jurisdiction and that of theCJEU and has restrained itself from evaluating the substance of a 
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refusal to make a reference for a preliminary ruling with the only notable exception being the 
Wind Telcomunicazioni SPA. v Italy judgement. 
A mutually benefiting and complementary relationship can rather be identified between the 
requirements of both courts. A decision that is required not to be arbitrary by the ECtHR is also 
more likely to be sufficiently weighed out in context of the CILFIT criteria as well contemplated 
as leave out any ambiguity and to be in line with the hypothetic opinion of courts of other 
Member States and the Court of Justice. Also vice versa, examination of the applicability of 
CILFIT criteria a priori means that the decision is most likely not arbitrary. Thus, the CILFIT 
criteria and requirement for the decision not to be arbitrary supplement and endorse each other, 
promoting compliance both with Article 267(3) TFEU and Article 6 of the Convention.  
A “symbiotic” relationship exists also in the context of State liability, which otherwise cannot 
arise from a breach of Article 267(3) TFEU. A breach committed by the judiciary must be 
“sufficiently serious” and particularly “manifest” to create State liability. Ferreira da Silva and 
Köbler cases suggest that a decisive factor for the CJEU is the attitude of the national court, 
which is at large determined by the thoroughness of the explanation. That corresponds to the 
approach of the ECtHR, particularly the standard of non- arbitrariness. 
Despite the controversial argumentation in the Commission v France judgement it seems not to 
risk disrupting the fine balance between the jurisdictions of both courts. Irrespective whether 
the judgement just significantly strengthens the obligation of Article 267(3) TFEU or makes 
the exceptions to the CILFIT criteria logically impossible to apply, the balance, which stands 
with regard to the different actors concerned by both courts, remains untouched.  
Nonetheless, a negative effect can be identified. The Commission v France judgment rather 
diminishes the “symbiotic” relationship between the requirements of Strasbourg and 
Luxembourg courts, that have the effect of positively complementing each other. Commission 
v France has significantly diminished if not dismantled the margin of appreciation for national 
courts adjudicating in last instance and thus the importance or reasoning and careful 
consideration on the side of the CJEU. In the situation when the applicability of act éclaire, 
acte clair doctrines or a motivated irrelevance can be rendered useless when presented with a 
contrary solution by the CJEU, the reasoning behind the latter losses usefulness as well. The 
preliminary ruling procedure of the CJEU does not benefit as much from the non- arbitrariness 
standard set by the ECtHR. However, nothing changes on the side of the individual who benefits 
both from the standard of non-arbitrariness and the stricter enforcement of Article 267(3) 
TFEU. Most likely outcome will be an increase of the references for a preliminary ruling made 
to the CJEU and therefore a decrease in the number of violations of Article 6 of the Convention. 
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